DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
## Security Committee

SECOM-D-278

7 July 1980

NOTE FOR:  Chairman, SECOM

STATINTL    FROM:

Executive Secretary

SUBJECT:  Possible Items to be Raised with ⬚ STATINTL
Chairman, Computer Security Subcommittee at
2 p.m. Monday, 14 July 1980 Meeting in Your Office

For your Background:

1.  I've invited ⬚                STATINTL

STATINTL    2.  ⬚ took over from a previous NSA Chairman who
was so disliked by the Committee that they used Robert's
Rules of Order to dismiss him.  His first year was spent
mending fences.

3.  Computer Security Subcommittee members are not
security officers by career designation (with the exception
STATINTL    of ⬚).  They are substantive computer system managers.

For Discussion:

4.  DCID 1/16 was premised on tenets that computer state
of the art offered small protection.  Thus 3 types of security
criteria was imposed in 1/16.

| | |
|---|---|
| Dedicated Mode | - the computer and people are all cleared and dedicated to the task at hand. |
| Compartmented Mode | - Uncleared people and material are removed from room while SCI is processed. |
| System High | - Everybody is cleared for the highest level material stored in the data bank. |

5. The Community seems to have elected "System High" as the way to go. Like the mandate that anyone near a gray/green phone be given an SI clearance, the "System High" approach forces a proliferation of access approvals. "System High" was designed to handle the possibility of a spill or dump of sensitive material to those who don't have need for it normally. The thinking was that a spill in a population cleared to 1/14 level was not as bad as a spill someplace in a random population.

Questions

Q. In 1980 are there hardware and software improvements in computer security to the degree that lockouts can keep uncleared people away from material they shouldn't have?

This becomes important as ▢ comes down the road and as computer networking expands.

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Q. What advice can the Subcommittee offer on how to handle the SI-TK ▢ material now in data banks ▢ becomes the only system?

Q. What are the big threats to computer security? And what does the Subcommittee propose to do about them?

Q. Does the Subcommittee have adequate association with other computer elements to keep abreast of improvements? And government policy?

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*cleared*

# ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

**SUBJECT:** (Optional)

STATINTL

**FROM:**
Executive Secretary
DCI Security Committee

**EXTENSION**

**NO.**

**DATE** 7 July 1980    STATINTL

| TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) | DATE | | OFFICER'S INITIALS | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | RECEIVED | FORWARDED | | |
| 1. Chairman, SECOM | | | | |
| 2. | | | | Attached is material for your background on 14 July meeting with ☐ Chairman, Computer Security Subcommittee. It includes: |
| 3. | | | | |
| 4. | | | | • Adm. Inman's nominating letter. STATINTL |
| 5. | | | | • A bio sketch on ☐ |
| 6. | | | | • A copy of his Committee's Annual Report |
| 7. | | | | • Some thoughts you might want to raise. |
| 8. | | | | |
| 9. | | | | |
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| 11. | | | | |
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FORM **610** USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
1—79